Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, peace scholars have been considering how to end the conflict and the modalities of what would come next. For a long time, the focus of supporters of Ukraine has understandably been on how to support the country in its existential fight against the invaders. However, the push by President Trump to consider—let’s call it—‘unorthodox’ approaches to ending the conflict has reinvigorated the debate over how to achieve a ceasefire and how to sustainably end the war. A prospect that has come back frequently is to deploy a peacekeeping force that would monitor ceasefire lines and act as a verification mechanism for the implementation of any peace agreement that might follow. Various options have been discussed, from a ‘traditional’ UN observer mission staffed by neutral countries, to a role for the OSCE, to what is now a particularly prominent option in public debate: the deployment of a “coalition of the willing” of primarily Western troops to act as ‘peacekeepers’ and monitor the implementation of a prospective peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine.

This proposed international force is sometimes compared to so-called traditional peacekeeping missions: lightly armed military observers that would act as an interposition force between belligerents to deter escalation, monitor ceasefire violations, share information, and keep the peace while the belligerents would work towards a more sustainable peace agreement. Despite some potential overlaps, however, I argue in this blog that there are important caveats to this comparison, and that these differences might make the comparison a possibly dangerous and misleading one.

The differences are perhaps best explained through the so-called ‘holy trinity’ of UN peacekeeping principles that the UN developed during its Cold War experiences: impartiality (not necessarily neutrality), consent of the parties, and non-use of force except in self-defence (and later: defence of the mandate). These principles are often misunderstood and taken to mean that peacekeepers should only sit in their bunkers, avoid risks, and write meaningless reports without taking action. While this is overblown, they do point to the fact that, in the end, the role of a peacekeeping operation is primarily to create a secure space for the parties to find a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict themselves.

With this in mind, it is important to observe that the proposed force, as it stands, would adhere to none of the relevant principles. Its inception as a coalition of the willing consisting of Ukraine supporters will make it partial from the outset. This means that it is primarily there to serve as an instrument of Western foreign policy to support Ukraine against potential renewed Russian aggression. Its potential as an impartial monitoring force which would assist the parties to overcome information asymmetries, lack of trust, or commitment problems, is therefore sharply watered down.

Meanwhile, while Ukraine appears willing to accept the international force, the Russian government has so far been rejecting the idea out of hand. This means that, at the moment, there is no consent from one of the key parties to the conflict. For Putin, having Western troops in Ukraine acting as supposed impartial observers is a non-starter. Several Russian cabinet members have warned that NATO troops would be seen as conflict parties and therefore could legitimately be targeted. While consent may ultimately flow from future peace negotiations, this is not a promising start. Peacekeeping research has widely shown the challenges that emerge from peace operations that operate with contingent consent.

Finally, it is still unclear what rules of engagement the international force would have. Would they be allowed to take assertive action to defend the terms of the ceasefire agreement? What will they be allowed to do against provocations that fall short of lethal uses of force (a tactic that Russia has developed extensively over the past decades)? Will there be a UN Security Council mandate to use “all necessary means” to defend the peace agreement (even as Russia sits as a veto-wielding member)? These questions are as of yet unanswered.

However, current discussions surrounding the importance of (American) security guarantees for the force seem to indicate that the coalition of the willing will only operate with at least the implied threat of serious retaliation against ceasefire violations. Furthermore, it is questionable whether European governments—with their previous experiences in peacekeeping missions—are willing to send forces if they do not have the robust means to defend themselves.

Given these essential differences, I argue there are at least two problems with the idea of deploying such a ‘peacekeeping’ force. The first echoes arguments made by Thijs Brocades Zaalberg regarding the dangers of labelling the force a peacekeeping operation. While Brocades Zaalberg makes a convincing point that using that label for selling the operation domestically risks creating unrealistic expectations, I would add that this misplaced label also risks delegitimising the peacekeeping concept internationally. It would draw the peacekeeping instrument further into ideological debates regarding the future of international conflict management. While the principles of UN peacekeeping missions mentioned above give them unique advantages as an international conflict management tool, their current international legitimacy is waning; using the term for a mission that is clearly part of a geopolitical struggle in Europe will only further deteriorate the meaning of the term.

Second, the force could offer both parties a way to stabilise the conflict and reduce its most severe impacts without offering sufficient incentives to move towards a more sustainable end to the war. In particular, this may only serve to freeze the conflict in place, thereby de facto acquiescing to the territorial conquests by Russia and offering Putin the means to rearm and initiate conflict elsewhere.

In conclusion, I would argue that, while an international monitoring force of some kind could play a key role in helping Russia and Ukraine move towards a sustainable solution to the war (as underlined by a recent report from the Geneva Centre for Security Policy), its current format has serious shortcomings.