Governing climate change has always been a battle of competing interests, thwarting meaning progress. It is a lack of solidarity which best describes the current state of climate change governance, exacerbated by events such as Trump’s presidential victory, Argentina’s withdrawal from COP29 and the unwillingness of some countries to phase out fossil fuels. These events directly thwart collective climate action and climate targets, and carry strong disproportional effects on the developing world.

The reality of climate action

COP28 promised the world the “end of fossil fuels”, and a more ambitious approach to climate funding. Its results were less than stellar. In 2024 we burned more fossil fuels than in 2023, and estimates hold that at the current rate, there is a 50% chance that we will exceed the 1.5 degrees threshold permanently in about 6 years. These numbers exclude emissions resulting from Israel’s war on Gaza, the war in Ukraine, and other global conflicts. As such, global climate action is off track in achieving its climate goals.

In addition, the 2020 deadline for pledging 100bn USD was met two years after the deadline. Climate funding has always been a sensitive topic as it is mainly a political gesture that takes no account of what developing countries need. Answering their actual needs, the number in USD would be around 1tn annually from 2025 and 1.3tn USD from 2030 onwards. Another example is the loss and damage fund of 700 million USD, which only covers 0.2% of the annual economic and non-economic losses in developing countries.

Insufficient climate action has led to an increase in extreme weather conditions, droughts, and record-breaking floods. These effects are disproportionately distributed, with the developing world often being affected the most, and having least funds to deal with damages.

A disproportionate climate crisis for the poor

Developing countries are disproportionately affected by climate change because they often suffer from structural vulnerabilities, such as wealth inequality, poverty and a lacking energy infrastructure. Poverty is directly linked to a country’s resilience to climate hazards and its ability to recover from them, placing developing countries at considerable risk.

For developing countries, insufficient climate funding impedes efforts to adapt to climate change. Take for example renewable energy, which is often championed to address both poverty and climate change through reducing emissions. Such solutions are overly optimistic, if not out of touch with the reality of developing states. A study on Central-America power system showed that the energy transmission infrastructure is incompatible with renewable energy alternatives, such as wind or solar. Many African countries face this kind of situation and require financial assistance to create such infrastructure.

The disproportionate impacts of climate change between rich and poor countries can only be bridged through adequate funding that takes into account the structural vulnerabilities of developing countries. Without solidarity, collective climate action becomes a tall order.

Fragmentation in governing climate change

National interests shape the debate on climate action and drive climate inaction. We see countries, such as China and India, labeled as emerging economies, claiming the right to develop and abstain from any fossil fuel pledges despite being in the top 3 highest emitters. Similarly, Saudi Arabia opposed any specific official pledge of phasing out fossil fuels during COP28, and again at COP29. Not surprisingly, fossil fuels are deeply embedded in economic growth.

The world is also experiencing a wave of anti-globalist politics, in which climate action, and frameworks such as COP and UNFCCC are perceived infringements on a country’s sovereignty and on free choice. This leads to the vocal rejection of climate change. Examples are Argentina’s Javier Milei’s statement that “climate crisis is a socialist lie”, or climate crisis denialist sentiments found in political campaigns, such as Trump’s “Make America Great Again” in the US, or “Nederland weer op 1” by the Dutch PVV (Freedom party) where climate change is labeled a hoax. Such narratives produce policies that seek to benefit the sovereign state, where concessions to economic growth have become a red line.

However, on a global scale, both economic growth and anti-globalist politics obstruct climate change governance. This was put on full display during COP29, when LDC and AOSIS countries vocalized their discontent with the 300bn USD climate funding deal. Additionally, funds are available, but it comes down to willingness.

Conclusion

The lack of solidarity in climate action, as illustrated at COP29, underscores the fragmented character of the climate change governance. At the heart of this lie competing economic and political interests which sabotage collective climate action. For meaningful change, we must understand the interconnectedness of the current climate crisis and acknowledge our differentiated responsibilities. Given the historic contribution in emissions of rich nations, they must take responsibility and lead the climate policy movement by example, allowing developing nations to address their populations’ needs first.