In vogue among policymakers as well as academics since the 2004 Madrid attacks, ‘radicalization’ emphasizes that involvement in terrorism is the end-result of an individual-level process in which the adoption of extremist ideas precedes and motivates the use of ideologically-driven violence. Although scholars like Clark McCauley, Sophia Moskalenko, James Khalil and Randy Borum have helped us understand that radicalization of ideas does not necessarily lead to radicalization of behavior, that theoretical distinction has until recently hardly been studied empirically. This is surprising, as the vast majority of people who radicalize will never become involved in terrorist attacks. Understanding the differences between extremists who do, and those who do not, become involved in terrorist violence is also crucial to threat assessment and prevention-oriented work, as it can underline those personal, behavioral or contextual factors that influence the likelihood of radicalization yielding terrorism.

Studying non-involvement in terrorist violence

Using funding provided by the Dutch Research Council and Public Safety Canada, we undertook a three-year research project on the differences between radicalized individuals who use terrorist violence and those who do not. Drawing upon existing insights, we were able to construct a codebook with 159 variables relevant to radicalization onset and outcomes. Alongside individual-level factors, we also captured group, movement, and socio-political influences. This broad perspective was complemented with specific attention to the influence of risk as well as protective factors. Research on terrorism has successfully identified a range of variables that increase the risk of radicalization, or the risk of radicalization leading to terrorism. Surprisingly, there has been relatively little attention paid to the protective influences that can mitigate or reduce the effects of exposure to risk factors.

We applied our codebook to 206 cases of Salafi-Jihadist and right-wing extremist radicalization in Europe and North America. Data wise, we relied on media reporting, courtroom records, and academic publications, as well as interviews with former extremists and privileged access to Dutch police investigative files. Half of our sample had been involved in terrorist violence, and it was also split 50/50 in terms of ideological background. With a median year of birth of 1980, our dataset is not necessarily comprised of today’s radicalized youth, but is nonetheless relevant to understanding the contemporary extremist threat landscape.

A counterintuitive result

Among the statistically significant differences between radicalized individuals who use terrorist violence and those who do not, we identified risk factors such as low self-control and access to weapons. However, the real surprise lay among the protective factors. Alongside pro-social ties to society such as parenting children, we found that association with an extremist group or movement had a protective influence. It took some time before we could make sense of this counterintuitive result. It turns out that a lot depends on the so-called ‘strategic logic’ of the group or movement in question. If such entities only emphasize the legitimacy and effectiveness of violence as a means of achieving their goals, as for instance Islamic State and al-Qaeda do, then involvement with an extremist group becomes a risk factor for terrorism. However, if they are willing to consider other strategies alongside violence, such as fundraising or recruitment to strengthen the group, or participation in (local) elections as an alternate route to power, then the likelihood that members will engage in terrorist attacks decreases.

A non-violent strategic logic is not just adopted because group members see electoral participation or increasing memberships as potential routes to success. It also reflects a desire for self-preservation borne out of the realization that group-based attempts to organize for terrorism are likely to end in death or long-term imprisonment. Although extremists are often characterized as ideological fanatics, many are unwilling to run personal risks for their cause.

Towards a better understanding of radicalization outcomes

Our project contributes to the growing body of work on the determinants of violent and non-violent radicalization outcomes. Taking risk as well as protective factors into account is a straightforward, but so-far underutilized, perspective that has considerable potential to push the field forward. Another angle that we consider crucial is extending the analysis beyond the characteristics and experiences of radicalized individuals. While such variables are undoubtedly essential to understanding radicalization outcomes, they should not obscure the relevance of influences at other levels of analysis, such as those to do with the socio-political context and the extremist groups and movements that feature so prominently in radicalization processes. There is a great deal still to be discovered.